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Commercial radio stations and advertisers have potentially conflicting interests about when commercial
breaks should be played. This paper estimates an incomplete information timing game to examine
stations' equilibrium timing incentives. It shows how identification can be aided by the existence of
multiple equilibria when appropriate data are available. It finds that stations want to play their commercials
at the same time, suggesting that mechanisms exist which align the incentives of stations with the interests
of advertisers. It also shows that coordination incentives are much stronger during drivetime hours,








atsweet@duke.edu“Unfortunately for advertisers, not every broadcaster runs commercial blocks at exactly
the same time. Therefore, the ﬂipper hell-bent on commercial avoidance can always ﬁnd
an escape route. Broadcasters cooperating with each other to standardize commercial pod
timing can cut oﬀ all ﬂipper escape routes. Imagine the poor ﬂipper; wherever he turns,
horrors . . . a commercial! Once the ﬂipper learns that there is no escape, he will capitulate
and watch the advertising.” (Gross (1988))
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
This paper estimates the strategic incentives of commercial radio stations deciding when to play their
commercial breaks. The question of whether stations want to play their breaks at the same time
(coordinate) or at diﬀerent times (diﬀerentiate) is interesting because, while advertisers would almost
certainly like stations to play their commercials at the same time, stations may not want to do so.
My empirical results, which show that in equilibrium stations do want to coordinate, indicate that
mechanisms exist which at least partially align stations’ incentives with the interests of advertisers.
Broadcast radio and television stations sell commercial time to advertisers and attract consumers
by bundling commercials together with diﬀerent types of programming. The ability of consumers to
try to avoid commercials by switching stations in search of non-commercial programming presents a
challenge to this business model and the evidence suggests that switching is quantitatively important.
For example, Abernethy (1991) estimates that in-car listeners switch stations 29 times per hour on
average and Dick and McDowell (2003) ﬁnd that in-car listeners avoid more than half the commercials
they would hear if they never switched stations. The above quotation argues that switching can
be rendered ineﬀective if stations air commercials simultaneously. However, while advertisers would
like stations to reduce commercial avoidance1, stations may have rather diﬀerent incentives because a
station’s revenues from airing a commercial are not directly related to how many people listen to it.
Instead, Arbitron, the radio ratings company, only reports estimates of a station’s average audience
and this may be maximized by playing commercials at diﬀerent times to other stations.
A simple model captures these diﬀerent incentives. Suppose that there are two commercial stations
(A and B) and an outside option for listeners which never has commercial programming (e.g., NPR
1Brydon (1994) argues that “for advertisers, the key point is this: if, at the touch of a button, you can continue to
listen to that [music] for which you tuned in, why should you listen to something which is imposing itself upon you,
namely a commercial break” and he suggests that stations should “transmit breaks at universally agreed uniform times.
Why tune to other stations if it’s certain that they will be broadcasting commercials as well?”.
2or a CD). There are two units of listeners. One unit has A as its preferred station (the “P1” in
radio jargon) and one unit prefers B. There is an inﬁnite sequence of odd and even time periods
and each station has to choose between playing commercials in even periods or odd periods, playing
music in the remainder. Listeners listen to their preferred station when it is playing music. When
it plays commercials a proportion θ of these listeners switch to the other commercial station if it is
playing music. If the other station also has commercials then θ0 of listeners will switch to the outside
option. If stations play commercials at the same time then the average audience of a commercial will
be 1 − θ0 and a station’s average audience will be 2−θ0
2 . On the other hand, if they play commercials
at diﬀerent times then these audiences will be 1 − θ and 1 respectively, as a lower audience during
ac o m m e r c i a li so ﬀset by a higher audience when the other station has a break. If θ>θ 0,w h i c hi s
reasonable if commercial stations are closer substitutes with each other than with the outside option,
then advertisers will want stations to play commercials at the same time while stations will not.
Of course, one might expect that the market would ﬁnd ways to align incentives.2 For example,
equilibrium prices should reﬂect the true value of commercials to advertisers. However, any individual
station has only weak incentives to increase this value if its own commercial audience is not measured.
This is particularly true because, even after recent reforms, the radio industry is still quite fragmented.
For example, in Spring 2008 the Chicago market had 37 commercial stations with 15 diﬀerent owners.3
Alternatively, advertisers may be able to measure the impact of their commercials even if they cannot
measure their audience. For example, retailers can see how product demand responds to running
commercials on a particular station or how many people respond when a commercial encourages them
to “call now”. Even if this response does not aﬀect the revenues of the commercial in question, stations
w i l lc a r ea b o u ti ti fi ta ﬀects advertisers’ willingness to pay for future spots.
I estimate stations’ incentives using panel data on the timing of commercial breaks by 1,091 music
stations in 144 radio markets in 2001. The data is extracted from airplay logs which record, on a
minute-by-minute basis, the music which stations play. Figure 1 shows the average proportion of
2One might expect that advertisers would specify that commercials have to run at particular times to try to enforce
coordination. While contracts do sometimes specify the hour in which the commercials will run, exact times are not
speciﬁed presumably because it is very diﬃcult for a station to guarantee a precise airing time in advance. I allow this
t y p eo fn o i s et op l a ya ni m p o r t a n tr o l ei nt h eg a m ew h i c hIs e to u tb e l o w .
3B a s e do ns t a t i o n sw i t he n o u g hl i s t e n e r st ob er a t e db yA r b itron. Information taken from Radio and Records website
(www.radioandrecords.com).





























































































































































































































































stations playing commercials in each minute during two diﬀerent hours of the day.
The distributions are far from uniform indicating that stations tend to play commercials at the
same time. However, we cannot infer from these aggregate patterns alone that stations want to
coordinate on timing because it could also be explained by “common factors” making some parts of
each hour particularly bad for commercials. Knowledge of the industry shows that common factors do
aﬀect timing decisions. For example, Arbitron estimates audiences based on how many people report
listening to a station for at least ﬁve minutes during a quarter-hour (e.g. 4:30-4:45). Listeners who can
be kept listening for ten minutes over a quarter-hour are therefore likely to count for two quarter-hours
so stations avoid playing commercials, which would drive away listeners, at these times. They also
avoid playing them at the beginning of each hour as many listeners switch on then and they are likely
to switch stations immediately if they tune-in during a commercial.
How can strategic incentives be identiﬁed if these types of common factor are important? One
approach would be to make exclusion restrictions and exploit variation in the characteristics of players
across markets. For example, Augureau et al. (2006) allow for the demographics of an Internet Service
4Provider’s (ISP) service area to aﬀect its preferred modem technology. Service areas overlap creating
variation in the expected choices of an ISP’s competitors and this allows strategic incentives to be
identiﬁed. One might hope that exclusion restrictions could be found here as well. For example,
if timing preferences were to vary systematically across owners (some ﬁrms like Clear Channel own
stations in many markets) or across diﬀerent music formats, then one might be able to identify strategic
incentives using plausibly exogenous variation in the ownership or format mix across markets.
Unfortunately I show that observable station characteristics have very little aﬀect on timing choices,
especially during drivetime, so that even if the exclusion restrictions are valid, they will not be very
useful in identifying strategic incentives. Instead I emphasize a more novel approach to identiﬁcation
which exploits the possible existence of multiple equilibria in the model and in the data. To see
the intuition suppose that stations play a timing game with two alternative timing choices (1 and 2)
which are equally attractive in terms of common factors (for example, neither is a quarter-hour). If
stations want to coordinate then there may be an equilibrium where stations cluster their commercials
at time 1 and another equilibrium where they cluster their commercials at time 2. If some markets
a r ei ne a c he q u i l i b r i u mt h e nt h et y p eo fp a t t e r nt h a tw ew o u l ds e ei nt h ed a t ac o u l dl o o kl i k eF i g u r e
2 which shows when stations in two markets played commercials during one particular hour. The
distributions in both markets have three peaks, just like the aggregate distribution, but they are at
noticeably diﬀerent times. If stations want to play commercials at diﬀerent times then we would expect
to observe excess dispersion within markets (market distributions less concentrated than the aggregate)
rather than clustering. If there is no strategic incentive then, if common factors are the same across
markets, then there is no reason why we should observe either excess clustering or dispersion relative
to the aggregate distribution. Therefore, if we can observe stations clustering at diﬀerent times in
diﬀerent markets and we can make some assumptions about how common factors vary across markets,
then we may be able to infer that stations want to coordinate on timing.
The idea that multiple equilibria can aid identiﬁcation is not entirely new: in particular, Brock and
Durlauf (2001) make this argument in their analysis of non-linear peer eﬀect models. The underlying
structure of our models is very similar, but I develop my results in the context of estimating a game
where the number of players is relatively small. In contrast, Brock and Durlauf consider settings with







































































































































































































































suﬃciently many players that summary statistics on the actions of other players can simply be included
as regressors in a single agent analysis. My approach - which raises some additional identiﬁcation
issues - is more naturally applicable in the type of settings usually considered by IO economists.
The obvious concern with relying on multiple equilibria for identiﬁcation of strategic incentives
is that some forms of heterogeneity in common factors across markets could generate patterns which
look like multiple equilibria. I show that controlling for observable heterogeneity and allowing for
parametric forms of unobserved heterogeneity does not change my results. Perhaps more convincingly
I also show that there are diﬀerences in the results across markets and hours which are consistent with
coordination. For example, strategic incentives should be stronger when listeners are more likely to
switch stations (both θ parameters larger in the model). This is true during drivetime hours because
in-car listeners, who are more numerous during drivetime, are closer to their dials/preset buttons.4
4MacFarland (1997), p. 89, reports that, based on a 1994 survey, 70% of in-car listeners switch at least once during
a commercial break compared with 41% of at home and 29% of at work listeners. Arbitron estimates that 39.2% of
listening is in-car during drivetime compared with 27.4% 10 am-3 pm and 25.0% 7 pm-midnight (Fall 2001 data from
the Listening Trends section of Arbitron’s website, www.arbitron.com). Abernethy (1991) estimates that in-car listeners
switch stations 29 times per hour on average.
6Consistent with this, and with stations wanting to coordinate, I ﬁnd greater clustering and estimate
a stronger incentive to coordinate during drivetime than outside drivetime. I also ﬁnd that there is
greater coordination in smaller markets, which typically have fewer stations, which is consistent with
some models of listener behavior.
The paper is organized as follows. The rest of the introduction reviews the related literature.
Section 2 describes the data. Section 3 presents the model of the timing game. Sections 4 and 5
discuss identiﬁcation and estimation. Section 6 presents the empirical results and Section 7 concludes.
1.1 Related Literature
The observation that radio and TV stations tend to play commercials at the same time has motivated
a small theoretical literature. Epstein (1998), Zhou (2000) and Kadlec (2001) assume that stations try
to maximize the audience of commercials and show that in equilibrium stations play commercials at
the same time. Sweeting (2006) provides theoretical models where strategic incentives should lead the
degree to which commercials overlap in equilibrium to vary with the propensity of listeners to switch
stations, which varies across hours, and market characteristics, such as the number of stations, own-
ership concentration and asymmetries in station listenership, together with some supporting reduced
form evidence. I provide further evidence for these diﬀerences in the current paper, which comes out
of the estimation of a more formal timing game.
I model stations as playing an incomplete information game. The incomplete information assump-
tion has typically been used for convenience when there are many players, many actions or strategies
are likely to be complicated (e.g., Seim (2006), Ellickson and Misra (2007), Augureau et al. (2006) and
the recent literature on dynamic games). In my setting stations make timing choices simultaneously
in real-time so incomplete information is more plausible. I present a simple test for imperfect infor-
mation and ﬁnd that I cannot reject this assumption. Bajari et al. (2007b, hereafter BHNK) provide
formal identiﬁcation results in incomplete information games, noting the current paper’s contribution
with respect to multiple equilibria. I use two common estimation procedures: a computationally light
two-step approach (e.g., BHNK) and the Nested Fixed Point algorithm (NFXP, Rust (1987)). The
two-step approach and the parameterization I use for the NFXP assume that a station uses the same
7strategy throughout my data and I present three tests which support this assumption.
Multiple equilibria have received more attention in games of complete information. I borrow
from several papers in this literature (Bajari et al. (2007a), Bjorn and Vuong (1985), Ackerberg and
Gowrisankaran (2006), Tamer (2003)) when specifying an equilibrium selection mechanism to close the
model. Several recent papers, including Ciliberto and Tamer (2007) and Pakes et al. (2006), have
shown that it is possible to estimate at least bounds on parameters in complete information games
without specifying a selection mechanism. The emphasis in the current paper is diﬀerent because I
actually use the existence of multiple equilibria to identify strategic incentives.
2D a t a
The data on the timing of commercials are extracted from airplay logs collected by Mediabase 24/7, a
company which uses electronic technologies to collect data on music airplay.
2.1 Coverage of the Mediabase Sample
I use logs from the ﬁrst ﬁve weekdays of each month in 2001 for 1,091 music stations, including
stations in the Adult Contemporary, Contemporary Hit Radio/Top 40, Country, Oldies, Rock and
Urban formats as deﬁn e db yB I A f n ’ sMediaAccess Pro database.5 This database is also used to
allocate stations to 144 markets, including all of the largest radio markets in the US with the exception
of Puerto Rico.6 While some stations have listeners in multiple markets (e.g., Boston and Providence,
RI), most of a station’s listenership is in its market of license and I treat music stations licensed to a
market as players in the timing game.
Unfortunately, the Mediabase sample does not cover include every licensed music station. Table
1 summarizes the coverage of the sample, splitting markets into two groups based on market size.
In large markets, the sample includes over 70% of stations, and they account for over 86% of music
station listenership because Mediabase concentrates on larger stations. The sample contains a smaller
5I combine stations in the Album Oriented Rock and Rock formats as stations in these formats play relatively similar
music and seem to make similar timing choices. I drop observations for two station-quarters where BIAfn does not
classify the station into one of these six formats.
6I drop observations from three markets (each with only one station) which enter the data only in December 2001.
These stations were used in earlier versions of the paper without signiﬁcant eﬀects on the results.
8Table 1: Coverage of the Airplay Sample
Largest 70 Sample Markets Smallest 74 Sample Markets
New York City, NY - Albuquerque, NM -
Knoxville, TN Muskegon, MI
Average number of 13.3 9.4
music stations in market
Average number of sample 10.3 4.9
stations in market
Average % of 86.6 66.5
music listening accounted
for by sample stations
Note: statistics based on licensed commercial stations in the six formats listed above which had enough
listeners to be rated by Arbitron throughout 2001
proportion of stations in smaller markets but it still includes two-thirds of music listenership. The
panel is unbalanced over time, both because Mediabase sample expands during the year and some
logs for individual station-days are missing. Overall there are 51,601 station-days of data, with up to
59 days per station. The issues which missing data create for estimating the model are discussed in
Section 5.
2.2 Airplay Logs
Table 2 shows an extract from an airplay log. The log lists the start time of each song and indicates
whether there was a commercial break between songs. I estimate whether any particular minute has
a commercial break using the following procedure:
1. the length of each song is estimated by the median time between songs with no commercials;7
2. a minute-by-minute schedule for each station-hour is created assuming that each song is played
its full length unless this would erase a commercial break or overlap the start of the next song;
and,
3. if the resulting breaks are more than ﬁve minutes long (a plausible maximum length), the break
is shortened to ﬁve minutes by sequentially taking minutes from the end and then the start of the
7I fas o n gi sp l a y e dl e s st h a n1 0t i m e sw i t h o u tb e i n gf o l l o w ed by a commercial break, I asssume that the song is four
minutes long, the median length of all songs.
9Table 2: Extract from a Sample Airplay Log
Time Artist Title Release Year
5:02 PM LIFEHOUSE Hanging By A Moment 2000
5:06 PM 3 DOORS DOWN Kryptonite 2000
5:08 PM MORISSETTE, ALANIS You Oughta Know 1995
5:12 PM POLICE Roxanne 1979
5:18 PM PINK Get the Party Started 2001
5:22 PM BARENAKED LADIES The Old Apartment 1996
5:24 PM SUGAR RAY Little Saint Nick 1997
5:26 PM KEYS, ALICIA Fallin’ 2001
5:30 PM KRAVITZ, LENNY Dig In 2001
Stop Set BREAK Commercials and/or Recorded Promotions -
5:40 PM SHAGGY Angel 2000
5:44 PM TRAIN Something More 2001
Stop Set BREAK Commercials and/or Recorded Promotions -
5:54 PM GOO GOO DOLLS Black Balloon 1999
5:58 PM CREED With Arms Wide Open 2000
break. This procedure increases the possibility of measurement error, so I drop station-hours
with fewer than 8 songs as measurement errors are more likely when more time is unaccounted
for.
2.3 Deﬁnition of Timing Choices
In common with the existing literature I specify a discrete choice game to estimate stations’ strategic
incentives. To do this, I need to specify a small number of timing options which stations will choose
between. As the end of the hour has the most commercials, I classify stations into three groups: stations
which are playing commercials at 50 minutes past the hour, stations which are playing commercials
at 55 minutes past the hour and stations which are playing them at neither of these times. As I will
show in Section 5, I can make assumptions under which it is consistent to simplify the game in this
way. A complication arises if a station has commercials at both :50 and :55 (possible if the station
has a short song between two breaks) but as I will show in a moment only a few station-hours have
this feature and, for simplicity, I simply exclude them from the rest of the analysis.
While I have data from every hour of the day I focus the analysis on four hours. 4-5 pm and
5-6 pm are two hours in the middle of the afternoon drivetime period when many listeners will be in
their cars and any strategic incentives should be quite strong. I focus on the afternoon drive because
10Table 3: Summary Statistics on Station Timing Choices
Number of station-hours with
no commercial commercial airing commercial airing commercial airing
Hour total at :50 or :55 at :50, not :55 at :55, not :50 at both :50 and :55
12-1 pm 50,567 23,611 13,858 12,896 202
4-5 pm 50,520 22,118 13,878 14,231 293
5-6 pm 50,361 22,300 13,886 13,917 258
9-10 pm 49,828 23,756 12,812 13,079 184
Table 4: Timing Choices by Format for 12-1 pm and 5-6 pm
Format
Adult
12-1 pm Contemporary CHR/Top 40 Country Oldies Rock Urban
No commercial at 12:50 or 12 :55 5,342 4,215 3,945 584 6,880 2,645
Commercial airing at 12:50 2,838 2,768 2,071 267 4,312 1,602
Commercial airing at 12:55 3,334 2,011 2,447 341 3,330 1,433
4-5 pm
No commercial at 4:50 or 4 :55 5,158 3,994 3,724 523 6,361 2,540
Commercial airing at 4:50 3,155 2,488 2,439 334 3,876 1,594
Commercial airing at 4:55 3,191 2,516 2,376 330 3,928 1,576
in the morning many stations have primarily talk programming and, because this leaves a lot of time
which is unaccounted for in the log, it is diﬃcult for me to locate commercials precisely: between 7
and 9 am more than 50% of station-hours fail to meet the 8 song criterion whereas less than 3% of
station-hours do so in the afternoon. I use 12-1 am and 9-10 pm as two representative non-drivetime
hours, although results look similar for several others which I have tried.
Table 3 shows the number of station-hours with commercials in each of the three slots, and the
number which have commercials at both :50 and :55. This latter number is always small, so that
dropping these station-hours should not introduce major biases. In every hour, between 50 and 60%
of the remaining stations are playing commercials at either :50 or :55. Table 4 shows that timing
choices vary relatively little across formats for 12-1 pm and (especially) 4-5 pm. This is signiﬁcant
because a standard way to identify strategic incentives would be to use variation in timing preferences
across formats and plausibly exogenous variation in the format mix of stations across markets.
112.4 Observable Station and Market Characteristics
I allow for several observable variables to aﬀect stations’ preferences and the strength of strategic
incentives. The ﬁrst set of variables is a set of format dummies. The Rock format has the most
stations (323). I deﬁne two dummies for stations owned by the largest radio companies, Clear Channel
and Inﬁnity (formerly CBS Radio). 310 (118) stations are owned by Clear Channel (Inﬁnity) at some
point during the year. Two variables describing market commuting patterns are calculated based
on data from the 2001 US Census: the average commute time (average 26 minutes) and the average
time at which people leave home for work in the morning (7:24 am). Unfortunately evening commute
data are not available. Market rank is an ordinal measure of market size based on 2001 population
(1=New York City, 144=Muskegon, MI). A station’s share is its share of music station listenership
(averaged over the Spring and Fall quarters in 2001). The average share is 0.10. Ownership HHI is
based on the ownership of music stations in the market, where each station is weighted equally (not
by listenership). The median ownership HHI 0.29. A listenership asymmetry variable reﬂects the
distribution of listenership across stations and it equals the sum of squared listenership shares divided
by the number of stations, so it is minimized at 1 when all shares are equal. The median value of this
variable is 1.23. The share, ownership HHI and listenership asymmetry variables are calculated using
all music stations in the market which have enough listeners to be rated by Arbitron whether or not
they are monitored by Mediabase. The HHI and asymmetry variables tend to be larger in smaller
markets (the correlations with market rank are 0.38 and 0.35 respectively).
3 An Incomplete Information Timing Game
This section develops the incomplete information game used to model stations’ timing decisions.
3.1 Payoﬀ Function
There are Nm (i =1 ,...,N m) stations in market m (m =1 ,...,M) and each of them chooses one of T
possible timing choices (t =1 ,...,T). As every market has more than one music station I assume that
Nm ≥ 2 even though there are some markets where only one station is observed. Station i’s payoﬀ
12from choosing action t is
πimt = Ximβt + αP−imt + εimt (1)
where P−imt is the proportion of other stations in the market choosing action t.T h i s p a y o ﬀ function
is a “reduced form” in the sense that neither listener or advertiser behavior are modelled. A notable
assumption, given that I have panel data, is that the model is static rather than dynamic. Section 6
shows that I cannot reject that each station uses the same choice probabilities throughout the one-year
period of my data which is consistent with this static assumption (meaningful dynamics would cause
stations to change their choice probabilities in response to the actions of other stations).8
The ﬁrst term (Ximβt) allows timing choices to have diﬀerent average payoﬀs (e.g., lower for quarter-
hours) and for station characteristics to aﬀect timing preferences. I make the standard normalization
that β1 =0 .S t a t i o n s a r e identical when they do not diﬀer in payoﬀ-relevant characteristics.
The second term (αP−imt) determines the strategic interactions which are the focus of this paper.
If stations want to coordinate then α>0 whereas if they want to diﬀerentiate then α<0.I a s s u m e
that there are no strategic interactions across markets. The formulation embodies several assumptions,
such as α being the same across markets, which I will relax in Section 6.
The ﬁnal term (εimt) is a random shock to a station’s payoﬀ from making a particular timing
choice. I assume that εimt is private information to station i so that the game is one of incomplete
information. The interpretation of the εs in my setting is that on any particular day a station has
to ﬁt commercial breaks around other pieces of programming (songs, competitions, weather updates)
in real time and, because it would annoy listeners to cut these types of programming oﬀ, this creates
some uncertainty about when commercials will be played.9 As this uncertainty is resolved in real
t i m ei nw a y sw h i c hs h o u l db eh a r df o ro t h e rs t a t i o n st o predict, the private information assumption is
reasonable. In Section 6 I will provide some evidence in favor of private information once I allow for
8One interpretation would be that any signiﬁcant dynamics took place in years prior to my data and that there are
no signiﬁcant shocks during my data which would reintroduce dynamic forces.
9Modern scheduling software potentially gives program directors greater control over when commercials are played.
However during drivetime stations typically use their most experienced DJs who are given a fair amount of discretion in
creating programming which appeals to the listener. It is notable that TV commercials placed precisely in pre-recorded
programming tend to overlap more than radio commercials. Warren (2001), p. 24 describes how playing commercials
at a particular time “can be done some of the time. But it can’t be done consistently by very many stations. Few songs
are 2:30 minutes long any more”. Gross (1988) says that the logistics involved in creating perfect “roadblocks” would
be “nightmare”.
13a persistent component of non-strategic preferences which is observed by all stations but not by the
researcher.
3.2 Station Strategies and Bayesian Nash Equilibria
A station will choose the action which maximizes its expected payoﬀs given the strategies of other
stations, i.e., t will be chosen if and only if
Πimt(Ximt,σ−imt,(α,βt)) − Πimt0(Ximt0,σ−imt0,(α,βt)) ≥ εimt0 − εimt ∀t0 6= t (2)




and σjmt is the probability that station j chooses action t before the εs are realized and from the
perspective of other stations who do not observe the εjs. These choice probabilities are the most
convenient way to represent strategies. It is also useful to deﬁne Πim(α,β) as the vector of diﬀerences
between Πimt and Πim1 for actions t =2 ,..,T
Πim(Xim,σ−imα,β)=
⎛






⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟
⎠
(3)
The best response function σim = Γ(Πim(Xim,σ−imα,β)) maps from Πim(Xim,σ−imα,β) into i’s
choice probabilities. The exact form of Γ depends on the distribution assumed for the εs. In a Bayesian
Nash equilibrium every station’s strategy is a best response, so that σ∗
im = Γ(Πim(Xim,σ∗
−im,β)) ∀i.
A Bayesian Nash equilibrium is symmetric if all stations with the same characteristics have the same
strategies. If α ≥ 0 then all equilibria must be symmetric.10 If α<0 then there may be asymmetric
strategies but it is easy to show that, for given parameters, strategies tend towards being symmetric
as the number of stations increases.11

















k6=i σ−k2 so that Πj2 > Πi2 and
Πi1 > Πj1. These inequalities, the fact that Xiβ1 = Xjβ1 and Xiβ2 = Xjβ2 for identical players and the property that









11The intuition is simple: as Nm increases
S
j6=i σ−imt
Nm−1 will look increasingly similar from the perspective of any two
stations who will therefore have increasingly similar best response strategies.
14Brouwer’s ﬁxed point theorem guarantees the existence of at least one equilibrium but the number
of equilibria can vary with the parameters. As an illustration suppose that there are two stations (i
and j), two actions (1 and 2), that εs are distributed extreme value (logit) and that Xj2β2 =0 .F i g u r e
3 shows their reaction functions for four diﬀerent cases, where i(j)’s best response is on the vertical
(horizontal) axis. In all cases Xi2β2 =0 .1 so i has a preference for choosing action 2. In panel (a)
and (b) α>0 so stations want to choose the same times for commercials and the reaction functions
slope upwards. In (a) the coordination incentive is relatively small and there is a single equilibrium.
It is larger in (b), so that the S shape of the reaction function (which comes from the shape of the
logit distribution) is more pronounced and there are 3 equilibria. The middle equilibrium (where
σ∗
i2 =0 .441,σ∗
j2 =0 .439) is unstable in the sense that the application of iterated best responses close
to this equilibrium would lead away from this equilibrium. The other equilibria involve the stations
choosing the same action with greater probability and the action which they are most likely to choose
diﬀers across the equilibria. If i’s preference for action 2 was increased then its reaction function
would shift upwards and only the equilibrium involving coordination on action 2 would survive. This
is consistent with the common intuition (e.g., Augureau et al. (2006)) that multiple equilibria are
unlikely when stations diﬀer substantially in payoﬀ-relevant characteristics. I show that observable
characteristics have little impact on timing choices especially during drivetime hours. In panels (c)
and (d) α<0 so stations want to choose diﬀerent times for commercials. Once again when the
strategic incentives are strong there are three equilibria, but this time they involve stations tending to
choose diﬀerent actions. A general property of the two action game when the εs have a bell-shaped
distribution (e.g., logit or normal) is that there are at most three equilibria.
3.3 Equilibrium Selection
Estimation can require closing the model with an “equilibrium selection mechanism”. This speciﬁes
that with E possible equilibria, equilibrium e is played with probability λe,
PE
e=1 λe =1 .
15Figure 3: Reaction Functions and Multiple Equilibria






























































































































































































164I d e n t i ﬁcation
The data consists of observable characteristics and, as outcomes, the timing choice of each station. The
parameters are identiﬁed if and only if a unique set of parameters gives rise to any set of probabilities
for each outcome. I separate the discussion into two parts: ﬁrst, the assumptions under which the
payoﬀ parameters are identiﬁed if the equilibrium choice probabilities of each station are known and
second, the conditions under which equilibrium choice probabilities can be identiﬁed from the data.
4.1 Identiﬁcation of Payoﬀ Parameters Given Equilibrium Choice Probabilities
Previous studies of identiﬁcation in discrete choice incomplete information games (BHNK, Pesendorfer
and Schmidt-Dengler (2007)) have assumed that the researcher can observe equilibrium strategies for
each station (σ∗
im). They have also assumed that a single equilibrium is played, and I will show
why multiple equilibria can provide additional identiﬁcation in this case. Throughout I assume that
β1 =0and that the εs are iid with a known parametric distribution. BHNK, p. 9 argue that these
assumptions are necessary for identiﬁcation. Hotz and Miller (1993) show that Γ function, which
maps diﬀerences in choice speciﬁc value functions to choice probabilities, can be inverted so that for










for t =2 ,..,T (4)
4.1.1 Identical Stations
The helpful role of multiple equilibria can be seen most clearly when stations are identical (Xim is the
same for all stations in all markets). In this case there are T payoﬀ parameters (β2,...,βT,α). The
ﬁrst identiﬁcation result is negative.
Proposition 1. If stations are identical and a single symmetric equilibrium is played in every market
then the parameters are not identiﬁed.




jnt ∀i,j,m,n,t so that the strategies of each station yield an identical set of linear equations.12
12The proportional formulation of the strategic incentive in the payoﬀ function implies that symmetric equilibrium
17There are T parameters and T − 1 linear equations so the parameters are not identiﬁed.
The choice probabilities also place no restrictions or bounds on the parameters in this case, i.e., for
any α we can ﬁnd βs which generate any observed set of equilibrium choice probabilities.13
Proposition 2. If stations are identical and at least two equilibria are played then the parameters are
identiﬁed.
Proof. One equilibrium provides T −1 linear equations. A second equilibrium must have at least two
equilibrium choice probabilities which are diﬀerent from the ﬁrst, providing at least one additional
linearly independent equation. Hence, the T parameters are identiﬁed.
Additional equilibria would provide additional equations, so that the parameters will be overi-
dentiﬁed. The logic of the proof also shows that the parameters will be identiﬁed with asymmetric
equilibria, as there will be additional equations for each set of equilibrium choice probabilities.
4.1.2 Non-Identical Stations
If stations diﬀer in observable characteristics which aﬀect timing preferences then additional variation
can identify the parameters. In particular, suppose that exclusion restrictions can be made so that
a station’s own characteristics only directly aﬀect its own timing preferences. In this case, variation
in the characteristics of other stations in a market will create additional sets of equations like (4)
as the
P
j6=i σjmts will vary for given values of Ximt.14 BHNK show that the parameters are non-
parametrically identiﬁed when there is suﬃcient variation in the characteristics of other stations. Of
course, multiple equilibria will still provide additional equations, and they may be particularly valuable
when variation in station characteristics is limited (e.g., there are a few discrete types). The helpful
role of multiple equilibria in this context is discussed by Brock and Durlauf (2001).
strategies will form equilibria in markets with any Nm ≥ 2.
13Of course, if one observed markets with one station (so only non-strategic preferences would aﬀect choices) then
one could identify strategic incentives from the diﬀerences in strategies between monopoly and oligopolistic markets.
However, there are no monopoly markets in my data.
14Note that having non-identical stations is not enough: variation in the set of station characteristics across markets
is also required. To see this suppose that there are three types of station and one station of each type in every market.
If the same equilibrium is played in every market then there are 3(T − 1) + 1 parameters and 3(T − 1) e q u a t i o n ss ot h e
parameters are not identiﬁed.
184.2 Identiﬁcation of Equilibrium Choice Probabilities From Observed Outcomes
When a single symmetric equilibrium is played the identiﬁcation of equilibrium choice probabilities
is trivial because, with inﬁnite data, they can be estimated by the frequency with which each action
is chosen conditional on station characteristics. This argument fails with multiple or asymmetric
equilibria. However, the equilibrium choice probabilities are still identiﬁed under certain conditions.
4.2.1 Panel Data and Equilibrium Assumptions
Suppose that we observe a long panel of data on station choices. If we assume that each station uses
one strategy over time then we can identify each station’s equilibrium choice probabilities from its
own choice frequencies. This approach allows for asymmetric equilibria because the strategy of each
station can be identiﬁed without assuming that stations which appear identical use the same strategy.
The assumption that one equilibrium is played within each market over time has been made previously
by Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler (2007) and Ellickson and Misra (2007). I will show below that
this assumption is consistent with the data.
4.2.2 Symmetric Equilibria and Identiﬁed Equilibrium Selection Mechanisms
With only cross-sectional data or a short panel it is necessary to identify the mixture of equilibrium
choice probabilities in the data. The equilibrium selection mechanism deﬁnes the frequency with which
each equilibrium occurs in the data.
The requirements for identiﬁcation are easily seen when there are two actions (t =1 ,2), stations are
identical and equilibria are symmetric. Dropping market subscripts (markets are identical), suppose
that there are N stations and up to E equilibria and that in equilibrium e action 2 is chosen with
probability σ∗
e2 and this equilibrium is played with probability λe. The probability that n2 stations














which is the pmf of a binomial mixture model with E possible components. This model has 2E − 1
19parameters (Eσ ∗
e2sa n dE − 1 λes) and there are N linearly independent equations (5). Teicher
(1963) shows that the parameters are identiﬁed if and only if there are N ≥ 2E − 1 stations (when N
varies across markets we need some markets with at least 2E −1 stations). The same condition holds
with more actions (Kim (1984) and Elmore and Wang (2003)) which is intuitive because a multinomial
model can always be broken down into a set of binomial models with stations choosing an action or
its complement.
The intuition for identiﬁcation of a mixture is that a mixture generates excess variance in the
number of stations choosing a particular outcome. Figure 4(a) shows a theoretical example. The
black bars show the pmf for the number of stations choosing action 2 when there are two choices,
N =8 , and there is a single symmetric equilibrium with identical stations and each station chooses
action 2 with probability 0.5. The white bars show the pmf when there is an equal mixture of two
symmetric equilibria. In the ﬁrst equilibrium each station chooses action 2 with probability 0.6 and
in the second equilibrium each station chooses action 2 with probability 0.4. The probabilities of
outcomes with many stations choosing action 1 and outcomes with many stations choosing action 2
are both higher when there are multiple equilibria. Note that if stations want to choose diﬀerent times
for commercials and an asymmetric equilibrium is played then outcomes with many stations choosing
the same action will have lower probability than could be generated by a single symmetric equilibrium.
In this case, there will be too little variance in the number of stations choosing a particular action, not
too much.
The remaining panels of Figure 4 show similar pictures constructed using data from 12-1 pm and 5-6
pm (as sample drivetime and non-drivetime hours). The red lines show the distribution of the observed
proportion of stations in a market-day-hour which play commercials at :55 out of the set of stations
playing commercials at either :50 or :55. I condition in this way in order to make the ﬁgure comparable
to (a), but stations making neither of these choices will not be ignored below. Panel (b) shows the
distribution for all markets, and panel (c) shows the distribution for the smallest 74 markets (roughly
breaking the dataset in half based on market size). For both size groups the density for 12-1 pm is
more concentrated around 0.5 than the density for 5-6 pm, consistent with there being more clustering
of commercials during drivetime. The solid black lines show the expected density if a single symmetric
















































































(b) Proportion of Stations Playing Commercials at :55 Conditional on Playing them at :50 or :55, All Markets
Red Line = Kernel Density for Actual Data, Black Lines = Expected Kernel Density for a Binomial Model +/- 1 Std Error
(c) Proportion of Stations Playing Commercials at :55 Conditional on Playing them at :50 or :55
in 74 Smallest Markets (Albuquerque, NM and smaller)
21equilibrium was played with each station choosing :55 with the probability that I observe it being chosen
in the actual data. Even though this simple model ignores any observable diﬀerences across stations
or markets which may aﬀect timing choices, it ﬁts the 12-1 pm data almost perfectly, with the actual
density being signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the expected density (i.e., outside the +/- 1 standard error
dashed lines) at only a few points. On the other hand, for 5-6 pm the distribution has greater variance
than the single symmetric equilibrium model predicts. The diﬀerences are particularly large in smaller
markets, and this will be consistent with the results below where I ﬁnd that incentives to coordinate
are stronger and multiple equilibria are more common in smaller markets during drivetime.15
The statistical mixture model literature has not considered models which would correspond to ones
in which stations in a market are not identical. However, the previous logic can be used to show that
identiﬁcation does not become more diﬃcult in this case. Suppose that there are two actions and S
observable types of station with Ns stations of type s using symmetric equilibrium choice probabilities
σ∗
es.T h e r e a r e n o w S∗E+E−1 parameters (S∗Eσ ∗




















Identiﬁcation still depends on having enough stations relative to the number of equilibria but notice
that the number of observed probabilities (equations) increases geometrically in the number of types
while the number of parameters increases only linearly. This means that, for example, the equilibrium
choice probabilities and the selection mechanism are identiﬁed when one has two equilibria and three
stations each of a diﬀerent type.
15Rysman and Greenstein (2005)’s Multinomial Test of Agglomeration and Dispersion (MTAD) provides an alternative
way of testing whether there are more markets where very many or very few stations choose the same action. Applying
the MTAD for the binomial choice model (:50 or :55 conditional on one of these actions being chosen) shows that there
is signiﬁcant clustering during both drivetime hours (p-values 0.000) but not outside drivetime (p-value 0.79 for 12-1pm
and 0.44 for 9-10 pm ). Examining the multinomial choice (:50, :55 or neither) one ﬁnds signiﬁcant clustering in all four
hours, although the test statistics are between 4 to 5 times larger for the drivetime hours.
225 Estimation
This section explains my estimation strategy. I start by showing why I am able to estimate stations’
strategic incentives using only a subset of choices, before outlining two diﬀerent estimation procedures.
5.1 Estimation Using A Subset of Choices
It is computationally diﬃcult to solve or estimate the game allowing for many possible timing choices,
multiple equilibria and diﬀerent kinds of unobserved heterogeneity. However, I can still estimate
stations’ strategic incentives using data on just two choices (playing ads at :50 or :55) if the εsa r ei i d
extreme value. To see why, label these timing choices 1 and 2 (β1 =0 ). The probability that station




















and the probability of action 2 conditional on action 1 or action 2 being chosen (σ∗
im(2|1 or 2))i s
σ∗




















jm(1 or 2) is the probability that station j chooses action 1 or action 2. β2 and α can be
consistently estimated using the conditional choice probabilities in (8) as long as I adjust appropriately
for the probabilities that one of these choices is made by other stations (σ∗
jm(1 or 2)).16
Variation in the proportion of stations choosing one of the two actions, potentially due to multiple
equilibria in the full game, can identify the parameters even if there is a single equilibrium in the
conditional two action game. The intuition is straightforward. Suppose that stations want to play
their commercials at the same time. If other stations are unlikely to play commercials at the end of
the hour then the incentives of a station which is playing a commercial then to try to coordinate with
16Note that it does not simplify matters to consider players choosing between action 2 and not action 2. In this case,
the probability of choosing action 2 is given by (7) which depends on all of the parameters. One way of viewing the
problem is that, without additional parameters, it is not clear whether stations get a beneﬁt from coordinating when
many of them choose “not action 2”.
23other stations are weak because it will likely only overlap with a small proportion of stations. On the
other hand, strategic incentives in the conditional game will be stronger when more stations are likely
to play commercials then.
This type of correlation is observed in the data. I created a dataset with observations on pairs of
stations in the same market, day and hour where both of the stations play commercials at either :50 or
:55. I also calculated the average proportion of other stations in the market which play commercials
at either of these times, and ran a linear probability model regressing a dummy variable for both of the
stations playing commercials at the same time (both at :50 or both at :55) on the proportion variable for
other stations. The correlation is positive in all hours, and it is signiﬁcant at the 5% level for 4-5 pm.
When the proportion variable is interacted with the rank of the market (higher for smaller markets),
the interaction coeﬃcients are positive and signiﬁcant at the 0.1% level for both of the drivetime hours
(insigniﬁcant outside drivetime). These correlations are consistent with the results below which show
that stations want to coordinate on timing during drivetime and have stronger incentives in smaller
markets.
5.2 Two Step Estimation
The two step estimation approach follows the panel data identiﬁcation argument set out above. If







where Ijdmt i se q u a lt o1i fs t a t i o nj chooses action t on day d and Djm is the number of days that
station j is observed in my data. These estimates can be used to calculate the terms in the inner
brackets on the right-hand side of (8) and a binomial logit model can be used to estimate β2 and α.
A necessary assumption is that whether an airplay log is missing is not related to a station’s timing
choice. Standard errors are calculated using a bootstrap where markets are resampled.
245.3 Nested Fixed Point Estimation (NFXP)
The NFXP algorithm solves for the conditional equilibrium choice probabilities at each iteration of the
parameters. The speciﬁcation which I use assumes that each station uses one strategy throughout my
data. The probabilities that stations choose actions 1 or 2 are parameterized in the following ﬂexible
way
σ∗
im(1 or 2) =
exp(β1 or 2 + ηi + ηm)




which allows for persistent station and market heterogeneity. A market may have persistently few
commercials at :50 and :55 because stations coordinate on having commercials at a diﬀerent time (e.g.,
:40). β1 or 2, γi and γm are parameters to be estimated together with β2 and α.17 ηi and ηm are
assumed to be known to all stations when they choose their conditional choice probabilities σ∗
im(1 or 2).
The simplest NFXP model consists the equations (10) and (8), with no unobserved heterogeneity
in the β2 or α parameters. Estimation proceeds in the following steps:
1. S (50 or 100 depending on the model) sets of Halton draws for ei and em are drawn from a
standard normal distribution for each station and market. Draws are made and the game is
solved for all music stations whether or not they are in the Mediabase sample.18 ei and em are




m vary with the parameters;
2. for each market for a given set of the parameters and draws,
(a) (10) is used to calculate σ∗
im(1 or 2);
(b) the equilibrium choice probabilities σ∗
im(2|1 or 2) are solved for by iterating best responses
(8). Experimentation showed that to reliably ﬁnd multiple equilibria, it is necessary to
begin the iteration process from extreme points in the strategy space (e.g., every station
chooses action 1 with probability 0.99 or 0.01) and to update strategies rather slowly.19 I
take strategies to have converged when the choice probabilities change by less than 1e − 8.
17Regressions (which are available on request) indicate that observable station and market characteristics have at most
small eﬀects on the probability that actions 1 and 2 are chosen and for computational reasons these variables are not
included in the speciﬁcation.
18I include all commercial music stations with at least 1% shares of radio listening at some point during 2001.
19For example, in some models I update choice probabilities by the maximum of 0.001 or 2.5% of the diﬀerence between
the current strategy and the best response. Updating more quickly can cause one of the equilibria to be missed.
25This approach can only ﬁnd stable and symmetric equilibria and, for given values of the
σ∗
im(1 or 2)s, the conditional game can have at most two stable and symmetric equilibria;
3. the choice probabilities are used to calculate the simulated log-likelihood based on the station-
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⎠
where nimt is the number of days on which station i chooses action t a n da c t i o n0i sc h o o s i n g
neither action 1 nor action 2. σs∗
imA(2|1 or 2) is the conditional equilibrium choice probability of
choosing action 2 in equilibrium A given simulation draws s, observed station market character-
istics and the structural parameters; and,
4. the parameters are updated using the Nelder-Mead algorithm and steps 2 and 3 are iterated until
the parameters converge.
I also estimate models which allow for unobserved heterogeneity in the remaining parameters (β2
and α). Estimation of these models requires drawing additional simulation draws in step 1 and the
including them in the calculation of the equilibrium choice probabilities in step 2(b). I calculate
standard errors analytically treating markets as observations.
An additional problem which arises is that the simulated log-likelihood can have multiple local
maxima, a common problem in mixture models (McLachlan and Peel (2000)). In practice, I only
found this problem to be signiﬁcant when several forms of heterogeneity were included and diﬀerent
maxima only had signiﬁcantly diﬀerent coeﬃcients for the listenership asymmetry and ownership HHI
variables, for which the results are weak in any event. Below I present the log-likelihood-maximizing
coeﬃcients starting from several diﬀerent starting points.
265.4 Comparison of the Two Estimation Procedures
I present the results using two estimation procedures because they have diﬀerent strengths and weak-
nesses when applied to the type of data that I have. The two-step procedure would generate consistent
estimates if I had a suﬃciently long panel of data without missing stations. In practice, there is limited
data on any station-hour (maximum 59 observations) and some stations are missing entirely, so that
my estimates of a station’s expectations about what other stations will choose (the inner brackets on
the right-hand side of (8)) are likely to be inaccurate. This is likely to bias the two-step estimates
of strategic incentives downwards and the bias may be larger in smaller markets where the sample is
less complete. However, the computational simplicity of the two-step procedure allows me to estimate
several speciﬁcations and to control for lots of observable characteristics. With these results I can
choose a plausible speciﬁcation for the computationally-intensive NFXP procedure, which can gener-
ate consistent and eﬃcient estimates as long as the fact that data is missing is not related to timing
choices. For this reason my discussion of the size of the strategic incentives will focus on the NFXP
results.
6 Empirical Results
I present the empirical results in the following order. Section 6.1 presents three tests of the assumption
that each station uses one strategy throughout my data. Sections 6.2 and 6.3 present the two-step
and NFXP estimates respectively.
Speciﬁcations are estimated separately for each hour, and I expect any strategic incentives to be
stronger during drivetime. I also allow strategic incentives to vary with three observable market
characteristics: market rank (higher for smaller markets), ownership concentration and listenership
asymmetry. The intuitions for why these variables may aﬀect strategic incentives if stations want to
coordinate are fairly simple (Sweeting (2006) describes theoretical models examining these comparative
statics).
Smaller markets typically have fewer stations. If switching listeners try every station before
listening to a commercial then a station will only be able to maintain its audience during a commercial
27if every station plays commercials at the same time. The probability that this happens increases when
there are fewer stations, increasing the incentive of every station to try to coordinate.20 A similar
result holds if listeners try only a sample of stations but they try more stations in larger markets.
Asymmetries in station listenership can strengthen coordination incentives if switchers are much more
likely to try one or two dominant stations. In this case, a station can keep most of its audience as long
as it plays commercials at the same time as just one or two stations giving it more incentive to try to
coordinate than in a market where stations are symmetric. Ownership concentration should lead to
more coordination because there are externalities in the timing game: a station’s timing decision will
aﬀect the audience of other stations as well as its own. Commonly owned stations should internalize
these eﬀects, and, because strategies are strategic complements if α>0, common ownership should
lead to other stations coordinating more as well.21 If stations want to diﬀerentiate then we would
expect commercials to overlap less when ownership is more concentrated.
6.1 Testing for Changes in Station Strategies/Within Market Multiple Equilibria
The two-step procedure and the NFXP speciﬁcation assume that each station uses the same strategy
throughout my data. This implies that the same equilibrium is played within a market over time. I
test this assumption using three tests which exploit diﬀerent features of the data. One of tests (the
pairwise correlation test) also provides evidence in favor of the incomplete information assumption.
6.1.1 Modiﬁed Likelihood Ratio Test (MLRT)
MLRTs have been developed in the statistics literature (Chen et al. (2001) and Chen et al. (2004)) to
test for the appropriate number of components in binomial mixture models. Here I apply the Chen
et al. (2001) test market-by-market to examine whether there is evidence of multiple equilibria being
played within markets.
The test assumes that stations are identical. If a single equilibrium is played every day then the






20I present results from speciﬁcations which include market rank rather than the number of stations. Results using
the latter variable are qualtitatively similar, but the coeﬃcients vary more across speciﬁcations.
21I allow common ownership to aﬀect coordination by allowing it to aﬀect the strength of strategic incentives rather
than, for example, explicitly modelling joint decision making across multiple stations.
28σ∗
2m)Nm−n2m, the pmf for a binomial model with a single component. If two equilibria are played on
diﬀerent days then the probability is (5) with E =2 , a binomial model with two components. Under





B2m)+C log(4λm(1 − λm)) (12)
where l(λm,σ∗
A2m,σ∗
B2m) is the standard log-likelihood for a two component mixture model and the
second term, where C is a positive constant, solves the problem that some of the parameters are
not identiﬁed under the null when only the standard log-likelihood is used. The test statistic is





2m)) where d σ∗
2m is the choice probability for a single component
mixture, and its asymptotic distribution is an equal mixture of χ2
0 and χ2
1 distributions. Chen et al.
(2001) show that this test is the asymptotically most powerful under local alternatives.22
I apply the test deﬁning the binomial actions in two diﬀerent ways. The ﬁrst way deﬁnes one
action as having a commercial at either :50 or :55 with the other action being having no commercial at
either of these times. The second way deﬁnes one action as having a commercial at :55 with the other
action not having a commercial at :55. The results are reported in part (a) of Table 5, which shows
the proportion of the markets where the null of a single component is rejected at the 5% level.23 The
proportion of markets where the null is rejected is small (less than 6%) in all station hours, consistent
with a single equilibrium being played within each market.24
6.1.2 Pairwise Station Correlation Test
The MLRT test is attractive in the sense that it uses the choices of all stations within a market
simultaneously, but it makes the unattractive assumption that stations within a market are identical.
The remaining tests do not make this assumption.
The correlation test examines whether there is any correlation in the timing choices of pairs of
22Chen et al. (2004) present a test where a two component model can be tested against a model with k>2 components.
This test is potentially useful for testing how many equilibria need to be allowed for.
23The test only uses the 124 markets with at least three observed stations because, as discussed in Section 4, a two
component model is not identiﬁed with fewer than three stations.
24One can also perform a joint test by adding the test statistics from each market and simulating this new statistic’s
asymptotic distribution. The null that there is only one equilibrium in each market cannot be rejected for any hour.
The same conclusion holds for the joint version of the other tests.
29Table 5: Test Results for Within Market Multiple Equilibria
Action 1: Commercial at :50 or :55 Commercial at :55
Action 0: No Commercial at :50 or :55 No Commercial at :55
(a) Modiﬁed Likelihood Ratio Test: Proportion of
Markets with Test Statistic Signiﬁcant at 5% Level (One Sided)
12-1 pm 0.035 0.056
4-5 pm 0.042 0.014
5-6 pm 0.028 0.007
9-10 pm 0.035 0.042
(b) Station Pairwise Correlation Test: Proportion
of Pairs With Signiﬁcant Correlations at 5% Level (Two Sided)
12-1 pm 0.058 0.050
4-5 pm 0.047 0.042
5- 6 pm 0.051 0.050
9-10 pm 0.053 0.049
(c) Station Runs Test: Proportion of
Stations With Signiﬁcant Runs at 5% Level (Two Sided)
12-1 pm 0.062 0.060
4-5 pm 0.062 0.050
5-6 pm 0.064 0.050
9-10 pm 0.048 0.044
stations in the same market. If a market switches from one equilibrium to another then stations’
strategies should change at the same time causing changes in their actions to be correlated. On the
other hand, if each station uses the same strategy every day (the null hypothesis) then actions will
only vary due to the iid ε payoﬀ shocks so that actions should display no time-series correlation.
The correlation test also tests the incomplete information assumption, allowing for there to be a
ﬁxed component of station preferences which does not vary from day-to-day and which is known to all
stations (this will be allowed for in some of the speciﬁcations below). Under incomplete information
a station’s strategy is a mapping from its own εs to its timing choices. On the other hand, under
complete information a station’s strategy will be a mapping from all stations’ εs to its timing choices
so that, even if the εs are iid and strategies do not change, there should be correlations in their choices.
Ii m p l e m e n tt h et e s tu s i n gt h ec h o i c ed e ﬁnitions assumed for the MLRT test. For each pair of
stations in the same market I calculate the correlation coeﬃcient for these binary actions.25 The results
25The signiﬁcance of the estimated correlation coeﬃcient e ρ is assessed using a t-distribution with (n − 2) degrees of
freedom where n is the number of days when both stations in the pair are observed in the data.
30are reported in part (b) of Table 5. There are only signiﬁcant correlations for a small proportion of
pairs (and in these cases there is a roughly equal mix of positive and negative correlations) consistent
with incomplete information and with stations using the same strategies over time.
6.1.3 Runs Test26
The ﬁnal test is a “runs test” which looks for serial correlation in a station’s own choices. A change
in a station’s strategy during the year should aﬀect how frequently it makes a particular timing choice
on consecutive days. The test is implemented by deﬁning binary choices as before, ordering the data
for each station by the calendar date and calculating how many runs there are of a particular choice
and whether there are more or less runs than one would expect if the data was randomly ordered.27
The results are reported in part (c) of Table 5. Once again, the test statistic is only signiﬁcant for a
small proportion of stations.
6.2 Two Step Estimates
Table 6 presents the two step results. Columns (1)-(4) present estimates for each hour for speciﬁcations
which allow for observable heterogeneity in non-strategic preferences (β:55) but assume that strategic
incentives (α) are identical across markets and symmetric across stations within a market. The
estimated α is positive and signiﬁcant at the 1% level for both drivetime hours, implying that stations
do want to play commercials at the same time. Very few of the covariates aﬀecting non-strategic
preferences are statistically signiﬁcant (Oldies at the 1% level for 4-5 pm and Clear Channel and
ownership HHI at 5% and 10% levels for 5-6 pm). These coeﬃcients are also small: for example,
the Clear Channel coeﬃcient for 5-6 pm implies that the conditional probability that a station has
a commercial at :55 increases by 0.025 when the station is owned by Clear Channel compared with
a mean probability of 0.50. The lack of signiﬁcant shifters of non-strategic preferences implies that
“exclusion restriction” approaches to identiﬁcation are likely to be ineﬀective.
26I woukd like to thank one of my referees for suggesting this test.
27For a (0,1) action, a run is deﬁned as a sequence of identical choices (e.g., 000 or 11). When n0s is the number
of 0s chosen, the expected number of runs is
2n0sn1s










where rs is the number of runs.
31(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Hour 4-5 pm 5-6 pm 12-1 pm 9-10 pm 4-5 pm 5-6 pm 12-1 pm 9-10 pm 4-5 pm 5-6 pm
β:55 coefficients
Constant 1.921 -0.065 2.278 0.099 2.794*** 0.217 2.723 0.340 3.097 0.129
(1.426) (1.234) (1.833) (2.564) (1.038) (0.924) (10.595) (18.850) (1.785) (1.552)
CHR 0.121 0.007 -0.482*** -0.850*** 0.128 0.003 -0.633*** -0.915*** 0.125 0.004
(0.082) (0.920) (0.092) (0.097) (0.082) (0.046) (0.196) (0.165) (0.077) (0.076)
Country 0.139 0.032 -0.026 0.322*** 0.130* 0.008 -0.063 0.507*** 0.118 0.008
(0.088) (0.101) (0.067) (0.102) (0.074) (0.084) (0.072) (0.132) (0.058) (0.082)
Oldies 0.413*** -0.046 0.159 0.395** 0.592*** -0.022 0.128 0.371** 0.552*** -0.037
(0.137) (0.141) (0.130) (0.212) (0.156) (0.114) (0.122) (0.166) (0.093) (0.132)
Rock -0.023 -0.013 -0.418*** -0.679*** -0.055 -0.015 -0.532*** -0.745*** -0.065 -0.006
(0.071) (0.077) (0.072) (0.092) (0.065) (0.052) (0.149) (0.172) (0.093) (0.063)
Urban 0.101 -0.076 -0.278*** -0.704*** 0.087 -0.122 -0.355*** -0.719*** 0.066 -0.110
(0.088) (0.087) (0.071) (0.118) (0.089) (0.083) (0.107) (0.155) (0.090) (0.092)
Station's Share of -0.482 0.025 0.527 0.263 -0.874 0.142 0.397 0.615 -0.830 0.211
Radio Listenership (0.519) (0.482) (0.414) (0.732) (0.318) (0.327) (0.506) (0.730) (0.055) (0.427)
Market Rank (/100) 0.078 0.052 -0.014 0.066 0.045 0.059 0.024 0.005 0.035 0.024
(0.102) (0.091) (0.088) (0.133) (0.112) (0.108) (0.515) (1.002) (0.109) (0.083)
Average Commuting Time -0.004 0.006 -0.021 0.016 -0.005 0.006 -0.024 0.015 -0.008 0.004
(0.007) (0.006) (0.011) (0.012) (0.006) (0.004) (0.062) (0.123) (0.010) (0.007)
Average Leave Time -0.253 0.010 -0.145 -0.065 -0.375*** -0.003 -0.197 -0.066 -0.399* 0.016
(0.201) (0.164) (0.242) (0.362) (0.141) (0.136) (1.313) (2.480) (0.221) (0.205)
Owner: Clear Channel 0.084 0.101** -0.049 0.151** 0.105** 0.060 -0.028 0.139*** 0.095* 0.070
(0.060) (0.043) (0.062) (0.062) (0.053) (0.047) (0.050) (0.036) (0.050) (0.440)
Owner: Infinity -0.026 0.019 -0.117 0.184* -0.094 -0.039 -0.124** 0.197*** -0.105 -0.018
(0.080) (0.095) (0.091) (0.106) (0.066) (0.063) (0.062) (0.072) (0.071) (0.089)
Ownership HHI -0.093 -0.489* -0.484 0.317 0.169 -0.629* -0.797 0.965 0.183 -0.619**
(0.420) (0.280) (0.388) (0.576) (0.376) (0.348) (1.032) (1.130) (0.610) (0.325)
Listenership Asymmetry 0.008 -0.082 -0.280 0.086 0.041 -0.170 -0.158 -0.201 0.022 -0.171
(0.146) (0.105) (0.161) (0.193) (0.158) (0.144) (0.373) (0.415) (0.166) (0.165)
Market Random Effect ---- 1.20E-08 5.30E-11 4.00E-06 6.94E-06 2.55E-07 7.84E-06
Std Deviation (3.42E-09) (1.62E-10) (2.58E-05) (2.98E-05) (6.09E-07) (2.10E-05)
Station Random Effect ---- 0.830*** 0.842*** 0.817*** 1.154*** 0.821*** 0.836***
Std Deviation (0.039) (0.046) (0.291) (0.301) (0.039) (0.048)
Strategic Incentive (α) coefficients
Constant 2.301*** 2.747*** 0.186 0.074 3.010*** 3.348*** 0.501 -0.619 0.480 3.443**
(All Stations) (0.337) (0.222) (0.345) (0.436) (0.286) (0.277) (10.030) (7.345) (1.277) (1.503)
   * Market Rank>50 ---- 1.717** 1.222*
(0.746) (0.703)
   * Market Rank>100 ---- 0.766* 0.747*
(0.461) (0.439)
   * Ownership HHI ---- -0.705 -3.108
(2.804) (2.253)
   * Listenership Asymmetry ---- 0.599 -0.561
(1.082) (0.962)
Same Format ---- -0.286 -0.240 -0.395 0.624*** -0.183 -0.176
(0.232) (0.308) (0.246) (0.183) (0.280) (0.322)
Log-likelihood -18817.0 -18370.9 -19210.1 -17101.4 -17736.9 -17330.6 -17239.8 -15328 -17726.8 -17324.1
Number of Station-Hours 27,889 27,574 26,548 25,669 27,889 27,574 26,548 25,669 27,889 27,574
Note: Standard error in parentheses, calculated using a bootstrap which resamples markets.  100 repetitions used for columns 1-8, 25 for columns 9-10.
***,**,* denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels respectively. Observations used are station-hours where the station plays commercials at either :50 or :55 and 
more than one station is observed in the market.
Table 6: Two Step EstimatesFor the non-drivetime hours (columns (3) and (4)) the strategic incentive coeﬃcients are positive
but statistically insigniﬁcant. The diﬀerence between the drivetime and non-drivetime results is
consistent with greater listener switching during drivetime strengthening strategic incentives. The
standard errors on α in columns (3) and (4) are similar to those in columns (1) and (2) suggesting
that this does not result from a lack of variation in the behavior of other stations across markets (as
could happen if the same equilibrium was played in every market). Stations in diﬀerent formats diﬀer
in their non-strategic preferences outside drivetime.28
The speciﬁcations in columns (5)-(8) allow for persistent unobserved market and station heterogene-
ity in stations’ non-strategic preferences and for stations to be more concerned about how they time
their commercials relative to stations in their own format. The heterogeneity enters as two normally
distributed random eﬀects. The station random eﬀects allow for an individual station to persistently
make a particular timing choice while the market heterogeneity allows a non-strategic explanation for
why stations in the same market make the same timing choice. The within-format strategic eﬀect is
allowed for by including an additional term in the model which corresponds to the term in the inner
brackets of (8) calculated only using stations in the same market-format.
While persistent station unobserved heterogeneity is important in all hours, the models which ﬁt
t h ed a t ab e s th a v ee s s e n t i a l l yn ou n o b s e r v e dm a r k e t heterogeneity in non-strategic preferences. The
“all station” strategic incentives for drivetime hours remain signiﬁcant. A legitimate concern is that
this result partly reﬂects the restrictive parametric form assumed for the market heterogeneity. It is
worth noting however that for the non-drivetime hours the problem of separately identifying strategic
incentives and market-heterogeneity results in much larger standard errors on many of the variables,
including the all station strategic incentive, while this does not happen in drivetime hours where
strategic eﬀects appear to be much stronger.
The within-format strategic incentive is small and statistically insigniﬁcant in both drivetime hours
implying that, at least when it comes to timing decisions, music stations interact in a fairly symmetric
28 In particular, Adult Contemporary, Oldies and Country stations are more likely to have later commercials. This
m a yb ee x p l a i n e db yt h e s es t a t i o n s ,w h i c ht e n dt oh a v eo l d e rlisteners than stations in some of the other music formats,
carrying news headlines at the top of the hour. If listeners will not switch because they want to hear the headlines then it
would be a good strategy for stations to play commercials right before the headlines. The estimated strategic incentives
imply that relatively few CHR, Rock and Urban stations try to copy these strategies outside drivetime.
33way. This ﬁnding is plausible if listeners switch primarily between preset stations and tend to preset
one station in each format.29 The format strategic incentive for 9-10 pm is signiﬁcant but it only
oﬀsets the negative and insigniﬁcant all station coeﬃcient.
Columns (9) and (10) allow the all station strategic incentive to vary with observable market
characteristics (market rank, ownership concentration and listenership asymmetry) during drivetime.
T h ep o s i t i v em a r k e tr a n kc o e ﬃcients are consistent with there being more coordination in smaller
markets but they are only weakly signiﬁcant. The NFXP results will support the suggestion that
this may be due to the incomplete sample biasing the estimates of α in smaller markets. None of the
ownership or listenership asymmetry interaction coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant.
I have also estimated several speciﬁcations whose results are not reported. One of these allows
for a non-linear strategic incentive by including the square of the variable which multiples the α
coeﬃcient in (8). Nonlinearities might arise if a station has an incentive to play its commercials
at a diﬀerent time, to attract a large number of switchers, once the vast majority of other stations
are coordinating. The coeﬃcients on the squared term in speciﬁcation like columns (1)-(4) are all
statistically insigniﬁcant (e.g. 0.417 (1.234) for 4-5 pm and -0.586 (0.844) for 5-6 pm) with the other
coeﬃcients almost unchanged. This result could be explained by linearity being the correct model or
by the variation in other stations’ strategies being too limited to identify more complicated eﬀects.
6.3 NFXP Estimates and the Strength of Coordination Incentives
The simplest NFXP speciﬁcation, whose results are reported in columns (1)-(4) of Table 7, assumes
that there is no unobserved heterogeneity in either β:55 or α. I allow at most one observable station-
speciﬁcv a r i a b l et oa ﬀect non-strategic preferences. Based on the two-step results, this variable is an
Oldies dummy for 4-5 pm and a dummy for CHR, Rock and Urban stations outside drivetime.30
The estimates of α are positive and signiﬁcant for both of the drivetime hours, implying that
29 For example, I have News, Sports, Adult Contemporary, Country and Rock stations preset and if I want to skip a
commercial then I would usually switch between these stations. Of course, several AC may have competed directly on
programming (but not timing) to be my AC preset choice. Arbitron data supports the suggestion that stations share
listeners as much across formats as within formats. For example, in Fall 2002 there were 6 Rock and 9 non-Rock home
contemporary music stations in Boston. On average 15.6% of the listeners to a Rock station listened to each of the
other Rock stations and 15.3% of the listeners to a Rock station listened to each of the non-Rock stations (“the cume
duplication” tables in Arbitron (2003)).
30A few stations change formats during 2001. When estimating the model I treat stations as being in their Spring
2001 formats throughout the year.
34Hour 4-5 pm 5-6 pm 12-1 pm 9-10 pm 4-5 pm 5-6 pm 12-1 pm 9-10 pm 4-5 pm 5-6 pm
β:55 coefficients
Constant 0.001 0.002*** 0.199*** 0.560*** 0.001 0.001 0.216*** 0.532*** 0.001 0.004
(0.001) (0.000) (0.009) (0.008) (0.004) (0.001) (0.011) (0.008) (0.009) (0.004)
Format Variable 0.005 N/A -0.417*** -0.932*** 0.005 N/A -0.474*** -0.938*** 0.005 N/A
(see notes for definition) (0.008) (0.015) (0.010) (0.033) (0.015) (0.011) (0.016)
Station Random Effect, Std Deviation 0.451*** 0.412***
-------- (0.009) (0.009)
Strategic Incentives (α)
Constant 3.304*** 3.404*** 1.818*** 0.476*** 0.106 0.200 0.125 0.025 0.107 0.706***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.104) (0.123) (0.261) (0.325) (0.308) (0.359) (0.118) (0.176)
Market Rank (Linear Effect) ---- 0.021 0.010 0.024 0.003 0.021 0.035
(0.139) (0.171) (0.860) (0.631) (0.338) (0.277)
Market Rank ≥ 5 0 ---- 1.205*** 1.741*** 0.119 0.020 1.214*** 1.790***
(0.119) (0.322) (0.444) (0.227) (0.236) (0.187)
Market Rank ≥ 1 0 0 ---- 1.563*** 1.177*** 0.252 0.011 1.574*** 0.855***
(0.171) (0.102) (0.437) (0.332) (0.194) (0.160)
Listenership Asymmetry ---- 0.099*** 0.101*** 0.076 0.008 0.100 -0.203***
(normalized mean 0, std deviation 1) (0.021) (0.020) (0.175) (0.118) (0.069) (0.044)
Ownership HHI ---- 0.052 0.053 0.053 0.011 0.052 -0.055
(normalized mean 0, std deviation 1) (0.050) (0.024) (0.150) (0.149) (0.074) (0.047)
Market Random Effect, Std. Deviation ---- 2.359*** 1.183*** 1.838*** 2.450*** 2.165*** 0.878***
(0.201) (0.050) (0.168) (0.168) (0.090) (0.051)
Probability that :50 or :55 are chosen
β1 or 2 0.302*** 0.312*** 0.139*** 0.047*** 0.306*** 0.294*** 0.217*** 0.200*** 0.309*** 0.269***
(0.009) (0.005) (0.009) (0.010) (0.018) (0.009) (0.011) (0.013) (0.006) (0.007)
Station Random Effect, Std Deviation 0.197*** 0.457*** 0.257*** 0.260*** 0.002 0.341*** 0.254*** 0.237*** 0.002 0.025**
(0.012) (0.006) (0.013) (0.013) (0.023) (0.007) (0.012) (0.011) (0.010) (0.009)
Market Random Effect, Std Deviation 0.397*** 0.707*** 0.250*** 0.319*** 0.344*** 0.647*** 0.294*** 0.371*** 0.349*** 0.402***
(0.014) (0.009) (0.009) (0.011) (0.014) (0.014) (0.011) (0.016) (0.007) (0.008)
Equilibrium Selection
λ 0.475*** 0.524*** NI NI 0.520*** 0.400*** 0.632 0.511 0.524*** 0.498**
(NI= not identified when parameters do not (0.018) (0.068) (0.088) (0.084) (0.596) (0.369) (0.135) (0.220)
support multiple equilibria for any simulation
draws)
Log-likelihood -52,857.60 -52,546.20 -52,712.70 -51,166.70 -52,587.30 -52,307.10 -52,698.50 -51,101.40 -52,326.40 -51,804.00
Number of Station-Hours 50,227 50,103 50,365 49,644 50,227 50,103 50,365 49,644 50,227 50,103
Notes: Standard errors in parantheses. ***,**,* denote statistic significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels respectively.  Estimation by simulated maximum likelihood using a Nelder-Mead search algorithm.
Number of simulations per station/market=100 for Model 1 and =50 for Models 2 and 3.  Format variable: for 4-5 pm an Oldies dummy, for 12-1 pm and 9-10 pm a dummy for CHR, Rock 
and Urban stations.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Table 7: NFXP Estimates
Station and Market Heterogeneity in Probabilities of Adds Market Heterogeneity in Strategic Incentives Adds Station Heterogeneity
in Preferences for :55 Choosing :50 or :55stations want to play commercials at the same time, and, consistent with mismeasurement aﬀecting
the two-step estimates, the coeﬃcients are larger than in columns (1) and (2) of Table 6. α is also
estimated to be positive and signiﬁcant outside drivetime although the incentive to coordinate is too
small to support multiple equilibria (so the λ parameters are not identiﬁed).
Columns (5)-(8) show speciﬁcations with both observable and unobservable heterogeneity in the
strength of strategic incentives (αm = Xmα + ηα where ηα ∼ N(0,γ2
α)). As well as the market
rank group dummies I include a linear market rank variable but its coeﬃc i e n ti sa l w a y ss m a l la n d
insigniﬁcant. The pattern that coordination incentives are stronger in smaller markets during drivetime
is more signiﬁcant than in the two-step results and the coeﬃcients are similar across the drivetime
hours. The listenership asymmetry coeﬃcients are also positive and signiﬁcant during drivetime but
the coeﬃcients are quite small (the standard deviation of the variable is normalized to 1 for the NFXP
estimates). There is signiﬁcant unobserved heterogeneity in strategic incentives across markets in all
hours, but during drivetime diﬀerences in market size explains quite a lot of the total variation.
Columns (9) and (10) allow for persistent unobserved station heterogeneity in non-strategic pref-
erences. This heterogeneity is assumed to be normally distributed and to be observed by all stations
when they choose their timing strategies. Consistent with the two-step results, this type of heterogene-
ity is clearly signiﬁcant, but most of the other coeﬃcients remain largely unchanged. An exception is
the listenership asymmetry coeﬃcient for 5-6 pm which becomes negative: therefore the Model 2 results
for this variable, while consistent with the overall ﬁnding that stations coordinate on timing during
drivetime, should be treated with caution. A disappointing feature of the results is that ownership
concentration is not signiﬁcant in any of the speciﬁcations.
The strength of strategic incentives associated with diﬀerent values of α can be illustrated using
an example. I initially abstract away from heterogeneity in non-strategic preferences. Suppose that
there is a market where all stations choose to have a commercial in one of the two time slots (:50 or
:55) with probability 0.6 (close to the drivetime averages). I analyze how diﬀerent values of α aﬀect
station best response probabilities and equilibrium strategies for stations playing commercials at one
of these times. The eﬀect of α on a station’s best response probability of choosing :55 is measured by
changing the conditional probability that other stations choose :55 from 0 to 1 (so the unconditional
36probability that they choose :55 changes from 0 to 0.6). The second column of Table 8 reports the
change in the best response. The third column reports the associated stable Bayesian Nash equilibrium
strategies. An entry of “(0.6,0.4)” means that there is one equilibrium where stations choose :55 with
conditional probability 0.6 and :50 with conditional probability 0.4 and another equilibrium where
these probabilities are reversed. To interpret the table, recall that the estimated drivetime value of α
for 4-5 pm for NFXP Model 1 is 3.3 and that the mean values of α f o rt h et h r e em a r k e ts i z eg r o u p s
for NFXP Model 2 are 0.04 (markets ranked 1-49), 1.34 (50-99) and 2.9 (above 100) with standard
deviation 2.36. The values of α are very similar for Model 3 and they are broadly similar for 5-6 pm.
Even for quite low values of α, a station’s best response is quite sensitive to the strategies of other
stations: for example, when α =1changes in the strategies of other stations can change a station’s
optimal conditional choice probability by almost 0.3. However, α =1results in no equilibrium
coordination in the sense that each station chooses each time with equal probability. The logic for
this result is quite simple (and can be seen graphically by centering the reaction functions in Figure
3(a)): if one station increased its probability of choosing :55, the best response of other stations would
be to increase their probabilities but by less, and the iteration of best responses would return stations
to making each choice with equal probability. Therefore observing that commercials do not overlap
that much does not imply that a station would not have quite strong incentives to coordinate if other
stations played them at the same time. As α increases above 3, multiple equilibria can be supported
and the stable equilibria involve greater overlap of commercials. For example, if α =3 .5 (a plausible
value in smaller markets during drivetime) an equilibrium can be supported where stations choose :55
with probability 0.685, so that the probability that two stations play commercials at the same time is
14% higher than if they choose each time with equal probability.
As already mentioned, there are externalities in the timing game which reduce equilibrium coordi-
nation. The last column of Table 8 quantiﬁes the equilibrium eﬀects of these externalities by showing
the strategies which would maximize stations’ expected joint payoﬀs. The calculation, which follows
one presented by Brock and Durlauf (2001), assumes that the εs remain private information. For low
levels of α, joint payoﬀ-maximizing strategies still involve no coordination. However, as α increases
strategies rapidly shift to involving much more coordination than equilibrium strategies, with almost
37Table 8: Eﬀect of Diﬀerent Coordination Incentives on Individual and Equilibrium Strategies
Best Response Incentive Bayesian Nash Equilibrium Joint Payoﬀ Maximizing
α Change in Choice Probability Strategies Strategies
0 0 (0.5,0.5) (0.5,0.5)
0.5 0.149 (0.5,0.5) (0.5,0.5)
1 0.291 (0.5,0.5) (0.5,0.5)
1.5 0.422 (0.5,0.5) (0.5,0.5)
2 0.537 (0.5,0.5) (0.829,0.171)
2.5 0.635 (0.5,0.5) (0.929,0.071)
3 0.716 (0.5,0.5) (0.966,0.034)
3.35 0.764 (0.561,0.439) (0.979,0.021)
3.4 0.770 (0.620,0.380) (0.981,0.019)
3.5 0.782 (0.685,0.315) (0.983,0.017)
3.75 0.809 (0.776,0.224) (0.988,0.012)
4 0.834 (0.829,0.177) (0.991,0.009)
4.5 0.874 (0.893,0.107) (0.995,0.005)
all stations making the same timing choice. One implication of this pattern is that even if stations
are trying to play their commercials at the same time they may well be coordinating much less than
they would if they maximized the joint value of their commercial time.
This paper has emphasized the role that multiple equilibria can play in the identiﬁcation of strategic
incentives. It is therefore interesting to examine how many simulated markets have multiple equilibria
at the estimated parameters. This shown in Table 9 for the models estimated using data from 12-1
pm and 4-5 pm. In NFXP Model 1 α is constant across markets so that the existence of multiple
equilibria depends only on the proportion of stations having commercials at 4-5 pm or 5-6 pm. For
4-5 pm, this proportion is high enough to support multiple equilibria in 34% of simulated markets,
while α is too low to support multiple equilibria in any simulated markets for 12-1 pm. Models 2 and
3 allow for observed and unobserved heterogeneity in α across markets: for 4-5 pm multiple equilibria
are supported in many of the simulated smaller markets, but they are only supported in larger markets
which receive a high ηα draw.
Fewer simulated markets have multiple equilibria in Model 3 even though the parameters are
similar to Model 2. This is because of persistent heterogeneity in non-strategic preferences. If a
few stations have a strong preference for playing commercials at :55 then, unless α is exceptionally
high, an equilibrium where other stations play commercials at :50 cannot be supported. On the other
hand, when some stations have strong preferences to play their commercials at a particular time, other
38Table 9: Proportion of Simulated Markets with Multiple Equilibria
NFXP Model Hour Markets Proportion of Simulated Markets with
Multiple Equilibria at Estimated Parameters
14 - 5 p m A l l 0 . 3 4
2 4-5 pm Rank 1-49 0.07
2 4-5 pm Rank 50-99 0.17
2 4-5 pm Rank 100+ 0.39
3 4-5 pm Rank 1-49 0.03
3 4-5 pm Rank 50-99 0.10
3 4-5 pm Rank 100+ 0.27
1 12-1 pm All 0
2 12-1 pm Rank 1-49 0.01
2 12-1 pm Rank 50-99 0.02
2 12-1 pm Rank 100+ 0.03
stations will also choose to play their commercials then. Therefore, while Model 3 implies that multiple
equilibria can be supported in fewer markets than the other models, it does not imply less equilibrium
coordination on the timing of commercials.
7C o n c l u s i o n
The paper was motivated by the observation that advertisers and stations may have conﬂicting incen-
tives about when commercials should be played. My ﬁnding that stations do try to coordinate on
timing, even though this may reduce their measured audiences, suggests that there are mechanisms
which align their incentives with those of advertisers. Perhaps the most plausible mechanism is that
advertisers are able to measure the eﬀectiveness of their advertising on diﬀerent stations, by seeing
how demand for advertised products changes, and that they reward the stations which give them the
highest returns by placing more commercials on them in the future.
While I ﬁnd that stations do coordinate on timing, their commercials still do not overlap perfectly
in equilibrium. One cause of imperfect coordination is that it is simply quite hard for stations to
play commercials at precise times because they have to ﬁt commercials in or around other types of
programming. This issue is more relevant for radio than television which makes more use of pre-
recorded and carefully scripted programming. It is also possible that coordination is imperfect partly
because incentives are not fully aligned. For example, a retailer who experiences only a small increase
39in sales may not be certain whether listeners avoided the commercial or whether the ad it provided
was not persuasive. From this perspective, it would be interesting to know how the recent decision of
Nielsen Media Research to release information on the viewership of commercials on television stations
separately from the viewership of other programming will aﬀect timing strategies.
The paper has also made a methodological contribution by investigating how multiple equilibria
can aid the identiﬁcation of strategic incentives. Assuming that the mixture of equilibrium strategies
in the data can be identiﬁed, having multiple equilibria will always be helpful for identiﬁcation for the
simple reason that it provides additional sets of equations which the parameters have to satisfy. That
having been said, I would certainly not advocate basing an estimation strategy solely on the possible
existence of multiple equilibria if other sources of variation are available, because the existence of
multiple equilibria may be more sensitive to the assumed model speciﬁcation. At the very least, if one
does rely on multiple equilibria then one should investigate the robustness of one’s results to allowing
for diﬀerent types of heterogeneity as I have done here.
However, even if valid exclusion restrictions can be made it is not appropriate to ignore the pos-
sibility that multiple equilibria exist in the data.31 The existence of multiple equilibria will lead to
the relationship between observable characteristics and a ﬁrm’s expectations about how other ﬁrms
behave to be a correspondance rather than a function. Inappropriately assuming that a function can
describe this relationship will lead to biased estimates even if any assumed exclusion restrictions are
valid. For this reason, I believe that it is important that we develop to tests to identify whether the
common assumption that “only a single equilibrium is played in the data” is really correct, and I hope
that this paper encourages further research in this direction.
31Note that commonly used strategies such as estimating a model assuming that there is a single equilibrium and
showing that only a single equilibrium can be found at the estimated parameters is not the same as allowing for multiple
equilibria for the simple reason that if they were allowed for during estimation then the parameter estimates might be
diﬀerent.
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